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ABSTRACT
Face transplants are an innovative and unusual form of 
modern surgery. There have been 47 face transplants 
around the world to date, but none as yet in the UK. Yet 
in 2003, the UK was poised to undertake the first face 
transplant in the world. The reasons why it didn’t take 
place are not straightforward, but largely unexplored 
by historians. The Royal College of Surgeons, concerned 
about the media attention given to face transplants and 
the ethical and surgical issues involved, held a working 
party and concluded that it could not give approval 
for face transplants, effectively bringing to a halt the 
UK’s momentum in the field. This extraordinary episode 
in medical history has been anecdotally influential in 
shaping the course of British surgical history. This article 
explores and explains the lack of a face transplant in 
the UK and draws attention to the complex emotional, 
institutional and international issues involved. Its findings 
have implications beyond the theme of face transplants, 
into the cultural contexts and practices in which surgical 
innovation takes place.
INTRODUCTION
In 2003 the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS) of 
England held a meeting to discuss the controver-
sial issue of face transplants.1 The surgeon Peter 
Butler of London’s Royal Free, had recently given 
a series of press interviews announcing his inten-
tion to undertake the world’s first face transplant, 
prompting considerable media speculation and 
concern from charities supporting people with 
visible facial difference. Over a series of months, 
the RCS President chaired a working party that 
interviewed specialists from medical organisations, 
ethicists, potential patients and the Royal Free, in 
order to evaluate whether face transplants were 
beneficial. The working party concluded, after 
some debate, that there was insufficient evidence 
to support face transplants taking place in the 
UK. In a paper published in the leading medical 
journal Transplantation it called for more evidence 
about the philosophical, psychological, ethical and 
surgical impacts of face transplants.
The working party’s decision effectively slowed 
the UK’s ability to undertake a face transplant, 
if not bringing it to a halt entirely. Although the 
RCS was, and is not, a regulatory body, it carried 
significant international influence as an arbiter of 
surgical and ethical standards. To undertake a face 
transplant without the approval of the RCS could 
be career ending, especially if the procedure ended 
badly. For Butler and his team, this was not the end 
of debate. They continued to move towards a face 
transplant, selecting patients, developing rigorous 
ethical and psychological protocols and securing 
National Health Service (NHS) ethical approvals, 
and raising funds, as the procedure would not be 
available on the NHS for reasons considered below.
In 2005, the possibility that the UK would make 
surgical history (as had happened so many times 
before, proponents argued, with reference to the 
development of facial surgery in World Wars I and 
II) was lost. The media spotlight moved to France, 
where in 2005 the first (partial) face transplant 
was undertaken on the body of Isabelle Dinoire, a 
woman whose lower face was chewed off by her 
pet Labrador while she lay unconscious from an 
overdose of sleeping tablets. Fifteen years later, and 
although there have been 47 face transplants under-
taken around the world, there has still been no face 
transplant in the UK (Alberti and Hoyle 2021).
British research into face transplants, and the face 
transplant that did not happen, is critically impor-
tant in understanding the contextual and contem-
porary issues that define whether or not surgical 
innovation takes place. There are numerous ways 
in which the RCS working party can be framed and 
imagined within a professional environment that 
is traditionally based on international competition 
and rivalry. These include the belief that British 
surgeons are, by contrast with their international 
counterparts, restrained by ethical inwardness and 
traditionalism, a belief that still carries enormous 
emotional and symbolic weight within the field. 
Equally significant, yet more nuanced considera-
tions, include the relationships between science, 
surgery and the media; between personal ambition 
and institutional support networks; the functioning 
of nebulous concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘need’; financial 
restraints and ethical codes of practice, all themes 
that governed the perception and practice of face 
transplants as a response to severe facial injury.
All these issues relate to, but do not fully answer 
the core questions of this paper, which is based 
on UK Research and Innovation funded research 
that has secured all University and NHS ethical 
approvals.2
Why did the RCS working party publish a paper 
against face transplants in the UK in 2004? And 
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why—even when ethical permissions were given and, the RCS 
found in favour of ethically informed facial transplantation in 
2006—has there still not been a face transplant in the UK? The 
answers to these questions are far more complex than might 
appear. As the oral histories used here show, they also reveal 
intense emotional and personal investment in surgical innova-
tion by individual practitioners and their teams, as well as the 
institutional and international frameworks in which surgery 
takes place. Ultimately, it is less surgical ability, though that 
has dominated the history of the surgery (Roche et al. 2015, 
99- 103), than the institutional, emotional, political, intellectual 
and psychological contexts in which innovation takes place that 
has shaped the UK experience of face transplants.
Virtually nothing has been written about this episode in 
history as history, largely because of its status as a non- event: in 
the end, no face transplant took place. Nevertheless, this was a 
critical episode in transplant history that continues to impact on 
the attitudes of British teams towards undertaking a face trans-
plant. It also contains in microcosm some of the most critical 
factors that determine the success or failure of medical innova-
tion today: surgical know- how, the functioning of teams, person-
ality and aptitude, risk, institutional support and the influence 
of external forces, including the media (most information can 
be found through the clinical and news literature of the time, 
for instance: McDowell 2002, 449- 460). As the authors have 
argued about face transplants in international contexts, innova-
tive medicine never takes place in a vacuum (Earle 2019, 7- 18), 
and the apparent disagreement between the Royal Free and the 
RCS needs to be understood within a complex history of insti-
tutional practice, personal ambition, financial support and the 
mutable definition of patient ‘need’.
In writing the first history of face transplants in the UK, then, 
focusing especially on the Royal Free Hospital between 1998 
and 2011, this article considers face transplants not as single 
acts, but as processes that intersected with institutional, personal 
and political contexts (Alberti 2020, 1106- 07). These included 
NHS research policies; the centralisation of ethical processes; 
the restricting of organ donation and transplant; the imple-
mentation of the Human Tissue Act and the role of the British 
media, a double- edged sword that created public awareness of 
the procedure, but also engendered professional antagonism 
(Howard, Danielle, and Cochran 2012, 6- 17; Lucassen and 
Kaye 2006, 690- 92; Wilson 2011). This analysis extends the 
current historiography of recent science, building on the work of 
Ronald E Doel and Thomas Söderqvist and others into the multi-
faceted political nature of modern science, and extending these 
findings into the present day (Doel and Söderqvist 2006, 1012). 
It also highlights the ways the political includes the personal, as 
the desires, ambitions and rivalries of key players impacted on 
how surgical innovation was conceived, framed and undertaken 
(or not).
METHODOLOGIES
This article draws on a mixed methodology of semistructured 
oral history interviews with key figures in the UK and inter-
national face transplant surgeons, as well as archival research, 
primarily using media sources, the 2004 and 2006 RCS reports 
and responses to Freedom of Information requests made to key 
organisations. The authors used Standards for Reporting Quality 
of Research Guidelines (SRQR) in undertaking this research 
(O’Brien Bridget et al. (2014). In total 16 interviews were 
conducted between February and September 2020, although 
subsequently we lost contact with one interviewee. The sample 
included eight transplant surgeons and researchers, of whom 
three had worked in the UK; two psychologists; three people 
with lived experience of facial difference; two ethicists and a 
Public Relations (PR) consultant. Participants were identified as 
significant actors in the history of UK face transplant through 
initial research and recruited via direct contact. Although 
offered anonymity, the majority of interviewees chose to be 
named or identified, which reflected both their desire to own 
their contributions and the historically public nature of face 
transplant debates (Moore 2012, 331- 40; where anonymisation 
was requested, the participant number is given in lieu of a name). 
Interviews were conducted via Zoom or telephone due to travel 
limitations during the COVID- 19 pandemic and were between 
60 min and 120 min in length. A semistructured interview guide 
was adapted to the individual expertise and experiences of the 
interviewee and was provided in advance as part of the consent 
process. All were audio- recorded and subsequently transcribed 
using a naturalistic approach, which preserved as far as possible 
the authentic direct speech of the contributors (Lapadat 2000, 
203–2019). Transcriptions were provided to participants for 
comment, amendment and additions before being analysed. All 
contributions were then analysed using thematic content anal-
ysis in NVivo V.12, a qualitative data analysis software, using 
Braun and Clarke’s reflexive approach whereby interviews were 
read and reread to highlight significant themes and to identify 
patterns of ideas, experiences and feelings (Braun and Clarke 
2006).
Oral histories were undertaken in this case to access perspec-
tives which are not otherwise available in the thousands of 
journal publications and media articles about face transplants. 
Published findings are, for the surgeons involved, the ‘official 
record’, but these reveal little about the impactful emotional and 
personal issues behind the scenes. Media articles often skew the 
discourse towards narratives of opposition, risk and competi-
tion, as we discuss further below. Oral history provides access 
to face transplants as both emotive, and emotional subjects, and 
as live issues, with personal, professional and emotional impli-
cations for those involved, many of whom are still active in the 
field (on the perils and potential of oral history, see Hoddeson 
2006). This gives the research process additional significance, 
not only as a historical account of a distinct moment in time, or 
an analysis of innovative surgery, but also a commentary on the 
present, with potential personal and professional consequences 
for those involved.
This approach also aligns to history as a discipline and to 
medical humanities more broadly, drawing on the textual and 
linguistic methodologies of emotion history (Plamper 2010, 237- 
65). This means that we are not interested only in the emotional 
entanglements that influence how a particular story or position 
is told, or the relationships between patients and practitioners 
that are necessarily part of those stories. Rather it suggests that 
however far we have come in moving away from the ‘great man 
of history’ model of the past that was so commonplace prior 
to the rise of social, cultural and linguistic history, viewing 
processes and structures as though they are objective phenomena 
is disingenuous. Innovation is necessarily emotional, involving as 
it does human actors and contexts. Why face transplants happen 
in some places and not others is, as the authors have argued else-
where, as much a reflection of personal characteristics (including 
ambition) as it is institutional, financial and technological factors 
(Alberti and Hoyle 2021).
As a result, we argue that the language, imagery and contexts 
in which face transplants have been imagined is as important 
as its factual chronology. History is never objective. Though 
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it draws on a common stock of evidence, written and verbal, 
choices are made about what matters and what is incidental. In 
oral history, choice- making occurs on several levels, from the 
selection of interviewees and the questions asked of them to the 
narrative strategies of the participants themselves. Furthermore, 
memory, the central theoretical component of oral history prac-
tice, is unfixed, responsive and dynamic, denying to some extent 
an empiricist relation between the past ‘as it happened’ and the 
present (Cubitt 2007, 71). Historians necessarily make argu-
ments on the basis of assembled, sifted and sorted evidence, and 
this process of selection is part of the historian’s craft. Yet in oral 
history, historians also become instrumental in the production of 
the past, implicated in not only the analysis but also the creation 
of their source material (Frisch 1990, xv- xvi). By acknowledging 
this interplay between researcher and researched, between the 
past ‘as it was’ and the past as it is constructed in the present, the 
research sought to understand an episode in the history of inno-
vative surgical procedure as it was (and is) interpreted in social, 
cultural and personal terms.
Over the course of our research and interviews, we discov-
ered many different ways the story of ‘what really happened’ 
could be told—ways that highlight the emotional contexts in 
which surgery takes place, the affective relationships between 
patients and practitioners, the blurred lines between private and 
professional interests, the working environments that shaped 
early twenty- first century research cultures, and the ideological 
and institutional structures that were part of the landscape of 
surgical innovation. As ethical researchers, we have not included 
evidence that might be personally or professionally hurtful to 
the individuals concerned, although that means we also exclude 
anecdotal evidence that has widespread currency as surgical 
‘gossip’ (Georganta, Panagopoulou, and Montgomery 2014, 
76- 81). Instead, we focus on the multiple, sometimes conflicting 
ways in which the story of face transplants in the UK might be 
told, given the professional, personal and institutional interests 
involved.
TIMELINES AND INTERNATIONALISM
The origins of an innovative procedure are often uncertain, 
and face transplants are no different. Most leading specialists 
develop and hone their skills and expertise in multiple locations 
with different teams before they are ready to launch an inno-
vative programme of their own. The earliest known reference 
to face transplant in England was made in a newspaper article 
in 1989, when British plastic surgeon Roy Saunders suggested 
that ‘it might 1 day be possible, although not for many years, to 
carry out whole face transplants’ (Wright 1989). Saunders was at 
that time a senior surgeon at Mount Vernon Hospital in north- 
west London and was using temporary skin grafts from dead 
donors in severe burns cases. His comments came in the context 
of publicising a fundraising appeal to support a new £7 million 
plastic surgery department at Mount Vernon, establishing a long- 
time link between face transplant and media interest. Four years 
later, Saunders’ former colleague James (Jim) Frame announced 
that he was ‘only months away from carrying the operation 
out’ (Halle 1993). Frame had been researching the technique 
since the early 1980s, first at Mount Vernon and then at the 
Burns unit at St. Andrews Hospital in Billericay, Essex. During 
an interview in May 2020, he recalled that he and Roy Saunders 
had almost performed a face transplant in 1987 on a patient 
with ‘almost a total loss of face from a deeply invasive squamous 
carcinoma’ but the man withdrew permission on the morning of 
the surgery (Frame 2020). They were aware of the immunogenic 
and potential psychological challenges, insofar as these issues 
were understood at the time. However, given the then permis-
sive ethical regime for surgical innovation he suggested that: ‘In 
the 80 s - if we’d have felt that that would help the patient, we 
would have done it and we wouldn’t have gone through any 
form of approval, we wouldn’t have needed it’ (Frame 2020).
The ethical landscape was very different in the 1980s to 
that confronted by the Royal Free team in the early twenty- 
first century. At the same time, discussions about other forms 
of multicomposite transplantation were progressing. In 1991, 
the first conference on vascular composite allograft (VCA, then 
known as composite tissue allograft) was held in Washington 
DC and focused on the potential for limb transplantation as 
a treatment for veterans of the first Gulf War. In England, the 
hand surgeon Simon Kay, based at St. James Hospital, Leeds, 
was discussing the possibility of thumb and hand transplants by 
1993 (Laurence 1993). However, at this time, most surgeons 
agreed that the immunological concerns were too significant 
to proceed in human patients. While temporary skin grafting 
could be achieved with existing immunosuppressant regimes 
such as ciclosporine, it was felt that high doses in the long 
term would be excessively toxic for life- enhancing operations. 
Research in the field was therefore focused on developing new 
immunosuppressant regimes or immunogenic tolerance. Major 
research programmes at Massachusetts General and Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital in Boston and the University of Louisville 
in Kentucky similarly developed interests in this area. And the 
world’s first successful hand transplant, performed in Lyons in 
1998 (and overseen by the surgeon who would lead the first face 
transplant), demonstrated that the immunosuppressant treat-
ments used in renal transplants were effective in VCA.
Subsequently an agenda for face transplants re- emerged in the 
international media. In an article in the British newspaper The 
Guardian in 1996, Professor John Barker, head of the Louis-
ville research team, was cited as suggesting face transplants 
were the next horizon for experimental transplantation (Millar 
1996). Around the same time it seems that Peter Butler, recently 
appointed as a consultant plastic surgeon at the Royal Free, 
began to consider developing face transplants in the UK. He 
had formerly worked with Jim Frame at Billericay (Frame 2020) 
and had been a Research Fellow with immunologist Andy Lee 
at Massachusetts General. Butler published a commentary on 
the possibilities of the surgery in the Lancet in July 2002, coau-
thored with his colleague Shehan Hettiaratchy, another alumnus 
of Mass General (Hettiaratchy and Butler 2002, 5- 6). In spite of 
the later controversy of the procedure, the paper doesn’t appear 
to have gained much traction or attention outside of the plastic 
and reconstructive surgery field.
However, this changed when Butler and Hettiaratchy gave a 
paper on the same topic at the winter meeting of the British 
Association of Plastic Surgeons (BAPS; from 2005 the British 
Association of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, or BAPRAS) 
on 27 November of the same year. Although the presentation 
had an innocuous title, a preview and interview with Butler in the 
Guardian sparked national media interest (Revill 2002). Reports 
suggested that Butler had claimed that the science was suffi-
ciently established and that he would be prepared to perform the 
surgery at the Royal Free ‘within 6 months’. He acknowledged 
that the critical question was not how but if the surgery should 
proceed, stating his engagement with potential concerns at an 
early stage (McDowell 2002). Within a short time, the ethical 
complexities of the surgery had established it as the subject of 
contentious debate, with facial difference advocates, surgeons 
and ethicists on both sides. While the latter raised concerns 
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about immunology, informed consent and functional outcomes, 
the former focused on the psychological and social implications 
of possessing another person’s face (McDowell 2002).
MEDIA INVOLVEMENT AS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD?
Since the 1980s British tabloids have been widely regarded 
as exploitative in generating headlines, whether the subject is 
poverty and benefit fraud, migrants, mental health or medical 
experimentation, though the press escaped state regulation by 
setting up the Press Complaints Commission as a regulatory 
body (Esser 1999, 291- 324; Hamilton 2003, 267- 82; Torjesen 
2015, 350; Vasterman 2005, 508- 30). While media involvement 
might conceivably have lent weight to the surgical drive, by high-
lighting the benefits to potential patients and garnering public 
support, that did not happen in the case of face transplants. 
Instead, the potential for nuanced debate was lost in a flurry of 
headlines about surgical intent, with ethical complexities side-
lined, and polarised positions created.
During this research, we were told informally that the British 
press, once alerted to the possibility of the first face transplant 
ever being conducted at the Royal Free, began harassing surgeons 
and patients, going so far as to tap private telephones and stalk 
vulnerable patients. Even without such intense speculation, 
media scrutiny would have been challenging for the Royal Free 
Hospital, since it had recently been involved in another media 
furore, when Andrew Wakefield, then a doctor at the hospital, 
claimed to have found a link between the measles, mumps and 
rubella (MMR) vaccine and autism. This controversy led to a 
crisis in public trust in vaccines and scandalised reporting by the 
British media (Fraser 2001).
There is no doubt that media coverage of Butler, a charismatic 
and socially well- connected surgeon, antagonised members of 
the medical profession who had been working in related fields 
for many years, as well as colleagues within the Royal Free. It 
was also felt as an affront to those who were personally directly 
affected by the coverage. James Partridge, then CEO of Changing 
Faces (a UK face equality charity) wrote letters requesting 
professional review of the procedure to a number of medical 
organisations (Partridge 2020). Partridge was himself caught in 
what Dinoire, the first face transplant recipient, described as a 
media ‘circus’ around face transplants, when tabloids speculated 
what he might look like as a face transplant recipient, rather than 
a person living with facial reconstruction (Bound Alberti 2017, 
148- 54; Duffy 2005; Partridge 2020). This is an example of the 
ways in which media involvement exacerbated the personal and 
professional issues involved, muddying rather than clarifying 
some of the ethical complexities.
In this speculative climate, the RCS convened a working party 
on facial transplantation, under the chairmanship of Professor 
Peter Morris, then President of the College. From interviews it is 
apparent that it was not only Partridge that sought a professional 
review from the RCS, but also BAPS (G01_008 2020). The party 
was comprised of a panelof medical and psychological experts: 
Sir Peter was a specialist in transplant immunology, and the other 
members of the group were equally renowned: J Andrew Bradley, 
a professor of surgery at the University of Cambridge, also a 
specialist in immunology and transplantation; Michael J Earley, 
a facial reconstructive surgeon; Martin P Milling, a consultant 
plastic surgeon specialising in burns injuries, based at Morriston 
Hospital in Swansea; Professor Len Doyal, an internation-
ally respected medical ethicist and Professor Nichola Rumsey, 
a psychologist who cofounded the Centre for Appearance 
Research in Bristol in 1990. The group met three times between 
April and September 2003, and interviewed Peter Butler about 
his research and intentions (G06_003 2020; G06_007 2020). In 
November they issued a report which confirmed Butler’s sugges-
tion that any face transplant ‘must be proceeded by careful and 
open debate’ (Morris et al. 2004, 330- 8, 330).
It is important to note that each of the parties involved, 
whether representing the RCS or the Royal Free, believed that 
they were acting in accordance with the best interests of the 
patient, though the former also had an eye on the reputation 
of the profession as a whole. In his discussions with the media 
and published articles, Butler did not downplay the potential 
psychological, ethical and surgical hazards of the procedure. In 
fact, one could argue that the most innovative work done by the 
Royal Free team in this area was their consideration, through the 
work of Alex Clarke, of the psychosocial and emotional aspects 
of face transplants. Until very recently, psychosocial issues have 
been neglected by facial transplant surgeons in favour of surgical 
ones (Alberti and Hoyle 2021). It is quite probable that under 
different circumstances—a decade earlier, say, when ethical 
protocols were less stringent, or even in the 2000s, without 
intense media attention—that Butler and his team would have 
carried out the face transplant. Once it had been brought to the 
attention of the Royal College, however, the working party felt 
bound to investigate whether they could approve the procedure. 
And they did not approve it, finally, setting out the main areas of 
resistance, including:
 ► Immunological challenges, including the significant poten-
tial for acute and chronic rejection, and the side effects and 
life- shortening impacts of immunosuppression.
 ► The psychosocial challenges associated with solid organ 
donation, which would be heightened by the central role of 
the face in communication, emotions and identity.
 ► The paradoxical nature of the ideal transplant patient, who 
would have to be desperate enough to require the procedure 
yet resilient enough not to need it.
 ► The impact on the recipients’ family and the family of the 
donor.
 ► The potential for societal misconceptions about people with 
severe facial differences, in particular that they could not live 
fulfilling and happy lives (Morris et al. 2004, 331- 5).
The most critical pillar of the RCS’s argument against face 
transplant was the issue of informed consent. If there had been 
no such procedure before, and the outcomes were uncertain, 
how could consent be secured? (G06_007 2020).3
It is difficult to imagine, given these challenges, combined 
with the weight of media interest (which typically followed 
innovation transplantation, raising the stakes should anything 
go wrong); the relatively recent Wakefield scandal over the 
MMR vaccine; the professional reputation of the College and 
the public and professional scrutiny that would fall on the first 
face transplant patient in the UK, that the RCS could have acted 
differently (Nathoo 2009). There were inevitably personal and 
professional conflicts involved, as there would be with any inno-
vative procedure, but these contexts were critical. So, too, was 
the oppositional framework in which the debates took place.
The publication of the RCS report in Transplantation in 2004 
coincided with a series of public events, including at the Royal 
Society of Medicine, which featured proponents for and oppo-
nents against the procedure. It is typical for moments in medicine 
to be entangled with their proponents; the gendered ‘great man’ 
school of science and medicine in which innovation is depicted 
as the work of a single genius. And there is no doubt that char-
ismatic individuals were at the forefront of debates. John Barker 
from Louisville presented the ‘for’ position at a debate at the 
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Science Museum, at which Peter Morris, Nichola Rumsey and 
James Partridge also spoke (Parker 2003).
By this time, face transplants were the subject of international 
controversy. Shortly after the publication of the RCS report, 
an ethical committee in France refused an application for five 
experimental face transplants that was submitted by Paris- 
based surgeon Laurent Lantieri (). A team based at Louisville in 
Kentucky, led by Barker, and another at the Cleveland Clinic in 
Ohio, led, unusually for these procedures, by a woman, Maria 
Siemionow, were also actively developing ethics applications. 
Between 2002 and 2005 dozens of papers were published in the 
scientific literature, culminating in a special issue of the Amer-
ican Journal of Bioethics (Special Issue 2004).
In the UK, the RCS report may have reaffirmed Butler’s 
commitment to the psychological and sociological dimensions 
of face transplants. Prior to the BAPS paper, Butler had recruited 
clinical psychologist Alex Clarke, to support the non- surgical 
side of programme development. Clarke had joined the plastic 
and reconstructive department at the Royal Free in 2002, orig-
inally to provide broad support to patients and surgeons. She 
became closely involved with the development of face trans-
plants because of her pre- existing interests in facial difference 
(Clarke 2020). Butler also consulted the British ethicist Professor 
Richard Ashcroft, who advised the Royal Free team on the 
complex medical ethics involved (Ashcroft 2020).
Ultimately the first face transplant was not conducted by any 
of the teams who had publicly declared their intentions, but as 
noted above, in France. Dinoire, a 38- year- old woman, received 
a transplant of the lower part of her face, including nose and 
lips, on 27 November 2005. The surgery was a collaboration 
between transplant specialists at Lyons, led by Jean- Michel 
Dubernard, who had led the team that undertook the world’s 
first hand transplant, and plastic and reconstructive surgeons at 
Amiens, led by Bernard Devauchelle. One of Dinoire’s leading 
surgeons suggested that the Amiens team had been preparing 
to do such a transplant for years, and that they had protocols 
in place in anticipation of a suitable patient. In contrast to 
what had happened in the UK, they noted, they did not want 
to alert the media or colleagues of their intentions until after 
the surgery had taken place (Lengelé 2020). However, against 
the wishes of the French team, news of the procedure was 
leaked to a British tabloid, and by the first week of December, 
Dinoire’s story had become global news (G06_004 2020). This 
is an important moment in the international history of face 
transplants, partly because the media furore that emerged, 
and that was damaging to Dinoire as a patient, has supported 
the presumption that the French team was ill- prepared for the 
public impact of the surgery. This is not the first time that media 
involvement has been critical of the course of modern surgery, 
as Ayesha Nathoo has explored in the history of heart trans-
plants, which helped transform transplantation from a patient/
practitioner to a ‘public’ concern (Nathoo 2009). In a similar 
fashion, media discussion of face transplants raised the stakes 
on surgical outcomes and put pressure on an already fraught 
series of professional relationships. On a practical level, the 
announcement shifted the focus of UK media debate from ‘if ’ 
to ‘when’ a face transplant might take place, since what was a 
theoretical concept became a reality.
The RCS’ recommendation did not stop developments at 
the Royal Free; rather, the team was apparently spurred on by 
surgical reports from France (Devauchelle et al. 2006, 203- 
209). In June 2006 the Royal Free Hospital and Medical School 
Local Research Ethics Committee met to discuss an application 
for a series of four face transplants on patients with pan- facial 
burns (Royal Free and Medical School Local Research Ethics 
Committee).
The proposal was the culmination of 4 years of intense effort 
on behalf of Butler and his team. Ethical permission was received 
by the Royal Free on 30 October 2006, (Royal Free Hampstead 
NHS Trust, 20 October 2020) triggering a patient selection and 
screening process which Butler and his colleague, Clarke, had 
developed in anticipation (Clarke and Butler 2004, 315- 26). A 
series of practical challenges followed ethical approval, however, 
which shows the importance of evolving ethical legislation.
An unexpected complexity for the Royal Free team came 
about in July 2007 when it became clear that the Human Tissue 
Authority (HTA) regarded faces as tissues rather than organs. 
While in France and the USA faces were defined as organs for 
the purposes of transplantation, a case needed to be made in 
the UK for that usage. Butler’s ‘abiding fear’ as stated in notes 
acquired from the HTA under a Freedom of Interest request, 
was that the details of the procedure would be requested under 
the Freedom of Information Act of 2000 (FOI) and that the ‘at 
risk’ status would be revealed.(Surname et al.) For the future 
of face transplants in this country, he wanted the whole proce-
dure to be seen as ‘squeaky clean’ (Human Tissue Authority, 10 
Sep 2020). If seen as tissue, the 24 hours needed to undertake 
medical tests prior to transplantation would render the donation 
unusable for face transplants, a point that Butler made convinc-
ingly to the HTA, who accordingly gave consent for the face 
to be regarded as an organ. There were further, practical steps 
needed: Specialist Nurses in Organ Donation (SNODs) had to 
be trained in soliciting facial donations, which was a concern 
to NHS Blood and Transplant, who feared general donor rates 
might be negatively impacted by requests for faces.
The RCS working group reconvened in light of events in 
France, and its findings were published shortly after Butler’s 
team received ethical permission from the Royal Free board. 
The second RCS working party report gave cautious support for 
facial transplantation, on the proviso that a number of ethical 
and psychosocial conditions were met in advance. If it had been 
difficult for the RCS to give support at the first meeting, it 
would have been difficult to reject face transplants entirely at the 
second, since proof of concept had been demonstrated in the case 
of Dinoire. So, setting out the precise ethical terms in which face 
transplants might be possible was an important intervention that 
had international influence (G01_008 2020; G06_007 2020). 
The second Report of the Working Party was also published in 
the journal Transplantation (Morris et al. 2007).
While members of the working party saw the document as 
critical to the safe conduct of the procedure, Butler’s team felt 
that it set out requirements they had already met—or met to an 
extent that was possible before a procedure took place (Clarke 
2020). The Royal Free’s face transplant programme did not go 
live until early 2010. During this time 4 patients appear to have 
been seriously screened for the procedure—although upwards of 
50 approached or were referred to the team for consideration—
and only 2 patients were placed on the waiting list for a donor 
match. The difficulty in identifying patients reflected the narrow 
criteria set out in the ethics application: individuals needed to 
have full facial burn injuries (Alberti and Hoyle 2021). As Clarke 
(2020) has since observed, this injury profile was problematic, 
not least because this was not a random section of the general 
population, and patients in this category might have higher rates 
of mental health problems. In 2011, the programme was indefi-
nitely placed on hold when Peter Butler took an extended period 
of leave. Shortly afterwards Alex Clarke retired, and the research 
nurse who had supported the project moved on. Although Butler 
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did return to work at the Royal Free, the programme was never 
started again, and the focus of his work shifted to tissue regen-
eration. The Royal Free website continued, until the summer of 
2020, to suggest that ‘the Royal Free is able to provide full face 
transplants’ (Royal Free Hospital). It now offers a more general 
historical and ethical account of the procedure, though also states 
that ‘the UK face transplant team…hopes to perform a full- face 
transplant in the near future’ (Royal Free Hospital). It is likely 
that this reflects the slowness of NHS website updates, rather 
than any ongoing capacity or ambition in the original transplant 
team. By contrast, there are several sites across the UK that now 
have the capability of undertaking face transplants, though for 
reasons of finance and risk, no hospital trust has committed to 
it publicly.
FRAMING FAILURE: WHY LANGUAGE MATTERS
The self- expressed ‘failure’ of the Royal Free to perform a face 
transplant was not unique among early developers of the proce-
dure. John Barker’s team at Louisville similarly never under-
took a face transplant, despite considerable preparatory work, 
and never received institutional ethical approval. However, the 
period during which Butler’s programme was active (2010–
2011) was the peak of face transplant activity around the 
world—more than half the world’s transplants to date were 
performed between 2009 and 2013 (Alberti and Hoyle 2021). 
As many of our interviewees observed, the fact that a face trans-
plant did not happen in the UK is at odds with the history of 
the UK as a country with a reputation for pioneering plastic and 
reconstructive work.
Why, then, did a face transplant not happen in the UK, even 
when the RCS gave its consent?
And why has there still been no face transplant, more than 
15 years on? Historically, the face transplant programme at the 
Royal Free was in development for over decade, but by 2011 
was dormant and while two other UK teams, in Glasgow and 
Newcastle, subsequently publicised their intention to under-
take a transplant, neither has done so. Ostensibly, Glasgow and 
Newcastle were hampered by available funding with the NHS 
refusing to fund procedures that are seen as life- enhancing, 
rather than life- saving (and NHS Scotland additionally identified 
a lack of potential patients.) (Puttick 2016). Yet the Royal Free 
attracted a reasonable level of funding through the charity Butler 
established while the programme was at its peak (Coombes 
2008, 18- 9).
In contrast to the trajectory of face transplants, hand trans-
plants, another form of VCA with a similarly complex ethical 
and emotional history, is well established in the UK. Led by the 
surgeon Professor Simon Kay, who first mooted upper limb VCA 
20 years earlier, the team performed the first ever hand trans-
plant in the UK in Leeds in 2012 (Leeds, along with Oxford, 
secured NHS financial support for the procedure) (Clark et al. 
2020, 28- 33). And there have been other VCA developments. 
The first abdominal wall transplant took place at Oxford in 
2013; the first womb transplant was scheduled to take place in 
2020, though it has been temporarily paused by the COVID- 19 
pandemic (G01_006 2020).
So, it is not the nature of VCA per se that is the issue. Argu-
ably, the moment for face transplants in the UK (and indeed 
globally) has passed, given the international issues involved in 
funding and outcome analysis, with the drive towards inno-
vation having moved towards tissue regeneration (Alberti and 
Hoyle 2021). There are financial reasons, including a lack of 
NHS funding as discussed above. And it is also the case that the 
risks attached to face transplants—ethical, psychological, immu-
nological—remain substantial. There is insufficient evidence of 
positive longitudinal outcomes and the risks would be borne 
by institutions and trusts as well as surgeons and patients. The 
potential for reputational damage is high.
Much of the history of medical innovation, notably in the 
fields of facial reconstruction and transplantation, concerns the 
development of skills and technologies, of ‘skin flaps’ and immu-
nosuppressants. Another strand of enquiry focuses on the social 
and cultural contexts, the ethical reasons why, in the case of face 
transplants, parts of the body might carry specific emotional 
load. But there’s another, equally significant aspect of innovation 
to consider, which is context. Whether or not a new technology 
is taken up and adapted depends not only on surgical expertise, 
funding and ethical approvals, but also timing, personalities and 
the emotional climate in which the surgery takes place.
To this end, there was a ‘perfect storm’ of circumstance that 
converged in the early 2000s to inhibit face transplants in the 
UK. Relevant factors include sensationalist media coverage; the 
past experience and reputation of the Royal Free (especially in 
relation to the Wakefield scandal); a limited number of potential 
patients; the concerns of the RCS, whose then President was an 
internationally- respected expert in transplantation; the interests 
of facial difference charities, who were far more influential in 
the UK than they were intentionally; international rivalry and 
competition; and the individual personalities involved.
It is too simplistic to view this episode in history as some kind 
of face- off between old and the new, between the quest for inno-
vation versus British traditionalism, or surgical ambition versus 
professional stagnation, though that is how the story of face 
transplants in the UK has been framed anecdotally. Certainly, the 
traditions of institutions like the RCS, whose emphasis was on 
appropriate codes of conduct rather than legal regulation, gave 
the episode a characteristically British flavour, but the College 
was not against face transplants per se; rather it identified the 
criteria that needed to be met. Indeed, members of the working 
party were subsequently in contact with surgeons in the USA, 
including Maria Siemionow, about best practice in the field 
(G01_008 2020).
The relationship between UK face transplant researchers and 
their international counterparts seems uneasy in retrospect. 
From a UK perspective, the ‘face race’ perspective favoured 
by the media championed the work of underdogs like Butler, 
perceived as following in the footsteps of Harold Gillies and 
Archibald McIndoe as pioneers of facial surgery (Bamji 2017; 
Geomelas et al. 2011, 363- 8). From an international perspec-
tive, however, the British lead was less convincing. There are 
specific axes of collaboration at work in international research, 
and it was common for the US and French pioneers of face trans-
plants to work together. There were rivalries, of course, and 
some of these have cast long shadows. But oral history descrip-
tions of the team and work culture at the Royal Free contrasted 
significantly to those of international face transplant teams. In 
the USA, for instance, John Barker and Moshe Kon talked about 
an enthusiastic and collaborative culture at Louisville, as well as 
frequently name- checking colleagues and talking about the inter-
dependence of large, collaborative teams. The same is true of 
Emmanuel Morelon and Benoît Lengelé from the Amiens/Lyon 
team. By contrast, the British experience was one of isolation 
and separateness. Alex Clarke described how ‘it could feel at 
times as if it was just Peter and me’, with it being difficult to get 
other individuals consistently involved.
The problems in maintaining a team at the Royal Free, and 
the centrality of Peter Butler as a lone figure, may have been 
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partly due to the NHS setting. There were few resources avail-
able for the face transplant programme over and above regular 
staffing, and Clarke described what a toll this took on the people 
involved, as a ‘labour of love’ with no reward. Forming and 
holding together a strong coherent team in these circumstances 
appears to have been almost impossible and might explain 
why no one could be named as a key team member or natural 
successor to Butler. This was a critical difference between the 
UK and US experiences, where an ‘open chequebook’ at Louis-
ville and competition between private institutions meant that 
there were opportunities that were unavailable in the UK, even 
in a research hospital. Yet it doesn’t necessarily explain why the 
Amiens/Lyon team avoided these limitations.
A LABOUR OF LOVE
Medical firsts can be impactful in many ways, and the history of 
science is littered with stories of inclusion and exclusion in the 
narrative of progress (Hopwood 2009, 146). For the Royal Free, 
the world’s first face transplant was the kind of innovation that 
could bring international research kudos. On the other hand, 
it also opened them up to significant institutional challenges 
and exposed the Trust to risk. Funding remained a problem. A 
lack of NHS resources could have been ameliorated by external 
grant funding, which interviewees described as impossible to 
secure because the work was too experimental. By contrast, 
US, French and Turkish teams were all able to secure funding, 
although in the US case this was primarily due to the support of 
the Department of Defense. Without research grants, Butler’s 
work was reliant on the unpaid labour of research students and 
medical students, who appear to have been important research 
resources. As Clarke put it ‘it was a real case of hand to mouth…
how can we do that with no money?’ (Clarke 2020). Butler also 
established The Face Trust to raise money for the programme.
(Charity Commission for England and Wales)
The lack of financial and institutional backing led to the 
importance of the programme being conceived as a form of 
moral action, which went above and beyond the requirements of 
standard medical practice. The personal and emotional invest-
ment of those involved in trying to establish a face transplant 
programme, in the belief that it was for the good of patients, 
was profound, and took a considerable emotional toll on some 
of the lead participants. Others described the sense of meaning 
and purpose the project had for them, in giving the best possible 
quality of life to patients. It was a gamble, to be sure, but wasn’t 
it better than what was currently on offer?
A different emotional perspective was held by James Partridge, 
founder of Changing Faces and Face Equality International, 
who talked about the personal cost of the media discussion of 
face transplants, especially the use and alteration of his image 
without permission, rather than any aversion to face transplants 
per se (Partridge 2020). However, special emphasis has been 
placed on the negative personal impact that the programme took 
on Peter Butler himself, in raising funds, caring for patients and 
trying to pioneer a new form of surgery within an NHS frame-
work. In Clarke’s words: ‘it took a huge personal toll on him…
it was tough on him…and disappointing’. Butler was open about 
the toll the work took on his health, and his then wife Annabel 
Heseltine wrote about the personal and professional ambitions 
involved (Heseltine 2008).
The immediate cessation of the face transplant programme at 
the Royal Free exposed the institution’s structural weaknesses, 
particularly after Clarke and other team members left and 
retired. In this context, the NHS research ecology had an impact 
on innovation at the level of the individual, with the desire to 
innovate and develop new ways of working unsupported by 
existing resources. Jim Frame told a similar story about his own 
trajectory in the NHS: as the institution became more prescrip-
tive and bureaucratic from the 1990s, his ability to exercise a 
free hand in experimental treatments was limited (Frame 2020). 
This perspective aligns with the development of stricter ethical 
protocols in the early 2000s, which some felt stifled innovation, 
and shut down productive risks that lead to progress (Ashcroft 
2020). This is not the first time that the idea of surgical ‘risk’ 
in innovation has been explored publicly (Frampton 2018). But 
from the 1970s, as Duncan Wilson has shown, there was more 
focus on ethics and accountability in medicine than ever before, 
as it was widely accepted that ‘doctors and scientists could not 
solve ethical problems on their own’ (Wilson 2014, 2). That did 
not, however, mean that surgeons were against using the media 
as a way to address public concerns, and even critique regulatory 
frameworks by the back door. It might have been perceived, as 
a Public Relations strategy, that attracting media attention, and 
highlighting the ‘need’ for face transplants as a matter of public 
interest, could shift the dial on political opinion and securing 
financial support.
In the British context, this was a gamble. Whereas the USA 
celebrates ‘Rockstar surgeons’, and advertises them as such at 
international conferences, British culture is far less forgiving 
towards innovators (Face Ahead). For the RCS and other inter-
ested parties, the intense media focus on Butler and his ambitions 
might have seemed insensitive and ego- driven, regardless of the 
intent. It was also reminiscent of other controversial leaders in 
the transplant field (such as Christiaan Barnard, associated with 
the first successful heart transplant in 1967) (Myers, Lu- Myers, 
and Ghaferi 2018, 363). Innovative procedures always involve 
a degree of personal charisma and ambition, and it is unreal-
istic to think that these emotional qualities can be removed from 
the drive to discover and trial new techniques. Moreover, the 
desire to innovate is not always antithetical to the best interests 
of patients.
It is clear from our interviews that whatever the reasons the 
RCS was initially opposed to the practice of face transplants, 
including whether they were clinically viable rather than simply 
a theoretical concept, the narrative of opposition (between inno-
vators and traditionalists, and between ‘great men’ in surgery) is 
influential, and not just in the UK. Perhaps because surgical inno-
vation is usually conceived in gendered terms of competition 
and one- upmanship, and because there are multiple competing 
interests, this oppositional narrative has not only been anecdo-
tally or professionally important—it has also influenced surgical 
practice (Liang, Dornan, and Nestel 2019, 541- 9). Thus, while 
ethics boards were designed to temper and moderate ambition 
in pursuit of an objective balance of risk and safety, the reality 
was rather more subjective (Doyal 1997, 314, 1107). The Royal 
Free Ethics committee was seen as helping Butler’s team to 
circumvent the RCS. From an insider perspective, the reported 
attempts by the RCS to put obstacles in the way of the procedure 
encouraged the committee to approve the research, if only to 
assert their independence. This may be connected to ideas about 
the ‘changing of the guard’, and a shift from the influence of 
the RCS towards a more centrally administrated ethics proce-
dure. As Thomas Schlich has observed of ethics around trans-
plantation before 1930, it was the ‘benevolent paternalism’ of 
the doctor that decided what was right; the patient’s ‘freedom of 
choice’ was yet to come (Shlich 2013).
This is certainly how the ethicist Richard Ashcroft framed the 
RCS’ intervention, viewing face transplants as situated in the 
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tricky period of this shift, when the procedure was available for 
scrutiny from both sides. Thus, the RCS was figured by some 
respondents as outdated, unreasonable and illogical—like ‘King 
Cnut turning back the tide’—but by others as reasonable, logical 
and acting in the interest of patients.
Oppositional frameworks continue to shape perceptions of 
early face transplant history. Proponents of the procedure at 
the Royal Free and their supporters characterise Butler as a bril-
liant surgeon who was wronged by history, whose desire and 
drive to make a difference was met with resistance and hostility 
(G06_004 2020). Accusations of phone tapping by the media, 
bullying by senior colleagues and professional bodies, and a 
lack of personal and institutional support illustrate an unhappy 
and unjust situation in which the UK drags its ethical feet and 
prevents medical innovation. The patient is depicted as the loser 
in the long run.
And yet the patient is also at the heart of the alternative narra-
tive, with charities supporting people with facial difference and 
the RCS guarding against individual ambition in defence of 
public good. This ‘for and against’ opposition was exacerbated 
by media reporting, which fed off the sense of controversy. It 
was also encouraged by the way the debate was framed. Clarke 
described how every public event about face transplant was 
designed as a debate, with the rehearsal of the same tired argu-
ments. In this way opposition and controversy nourished each 
other, making communication and negotiation between the ‘two 
sides’ very difficult (Clarke 2020).
This combative dynamic is heavily gendered. It is notable that 
the relationship between the two women who were centrally 
involved in the process, psychologists Clarke (who worked 
with Butler at the Royal Free) and Rumsey (who sat on the RCS 
working party), was not oppositional but described as actively 
constructive, despite them being on ‘different sides’ of the 
committee table and the process. What is also lost in the oppo-
sitional narrative, in its focus on the ethics of face transplants 
and the work of leading surgeons, is the experience and views 
of extended team members—nurses, immunologists, prosthetists 
and transplantation specialists—and the patients themselves.
Patients and donors
One thing all interviewees agreed on is that Butler really wanted 
to help his patients. However, the signifier of ‘patient’ seems to 
mean two things throughout the interviews. There are the actual 
patients, who are seen and screened by team, and the notional 
‘patient’ who was constructed through the course of the long 
ethical debate. The notional patient is the motivating factor—
Butler spoke of these regularly and emotively in the media. This 
individual had severe functional and psychosocial problems as a 
result of their facial difference; their life would be transformed 
by a face transplant. It is possible to speak of this ‘patient’ gener-
ically, or with reference to past patients who have inspired the 
notion. They are the individuals who appear, for example, in the 
arguments to the ethics committees and the American Journal 
of Bioethics special issue (Special Issue 2004, 4). These patients 
are straightforward to talk about, because they are hypothetical. 
Speaking of Butler’s presentations to French meetings prior to 
2005, Lengelé called them ‘concepts’, that prefigured the poten-
tial recipient in unhelpful ways. This may be the beginning of 
the ‘ideal patient’ that Samuel Taylor Alexander described, one 
constructed to justify the need for face transplant (Taylor Alex-
ander 2014, 27- 50).
By contrast, actual patients were problematic, for a whole 
range of reasons. Fundamentally, it was challenging to identify 
a patient who fit the face transplant criteria—someone who had 
the right functional indication and the right psychological profile. 
In addition, an individual needed a strong support network; the 
ability to commit consistently to a strict medication regime; 
and a geographical location within a reasonable distance of the 
Royal Free. The UK team had even further restricted their pool 
of potential applicants by applying for ethics clearance for full- 
facial burns, which would only require a ‘skin envelope’ trans-
plant rather than the transplant of bone, muscles, tongue and 
teeth. This may have been an attempt to make the proposition 
palatable to an ethics committee, and to avoid questions about 
recipient/donor likeness. However, this patient pool wasn’t 
conducive to the other criteria for transplant. Clarke explained 
that patients with full- facial burns were problematic because it 
was a rare injury. And while the team’s ideal candidate would 
have been a veteran, as someone likely to have severe injuries 
and a robust attitude, they found this cohort to be least likely to 
want a transplant and most well- adjusted to their facial change. 
The paradox of the face transplant patient was that the people 
most likely to cope with one were those who had the least need 
for it. After all those years of fitting for ethical clearance they 
ended up with ‘a procedure without a problem’, as Clarke put it.
This problem isn’t specific to the UK, but rather a challenge 
that has been observed frequently in the literature on face trans-
plants. Globally, face transplant units have identified extremely 
small numbers of potential candidates. There are also interna-
tional differences in the perception of need. Face transplants 
have become associated with ballistic injuries and workplace 
accidents that are not perceived to be as common in Europe and 
the UK as elsewhere. America is often cited as being different in 
this respect. However, as of 2018 there were only two people 
on the waiting list in the whole of the USA. This suggests that 
patient need is always projected ‘elsewhere’.
The lack of patients exacerbated another problem, moreover, 
namely a lack of donors. The donation issues that emerge in 
the interviews are emotional, cultural, organisational and prac-
tical. Culturally the UK already had low rates of organ donation. 
Understandably NHS Blood and Transplant, the responsible 
body, didn’t want to jeopardise this any further by requesting 
families to donate something as personal and significant as a face. 
While Butler and Clarke did research with donating families to 
develop protocols to approach facial donation, their conclusions 
didn’t trickle down to the ground level. Local SNODs were orig-
inally hesitant, though supportive of the team. In other places, 
SNODs have expressed resistance to face donation, for fear that 
raising the question could put potential donors off. Removing a 
face is also slow and laborious and could impede the life- saving 
removal of solid organs. Clarke described how few calls they 
ever received offering a donor. Once one then takes into account 
the practical problem of physical and immunological compat-
ibility (human leucocyte antigen) with a small recipient pool, 
potential donors could be reduced to zero.
THE UNKNOWNS OF FACE TRANSPLANT SURGERY
Whenever surgeons embark on a novel procedure there are 
unknowns. In the case of face transplants, surgeons knew that 
recipients would need immunosuppression; they knew to expect 
rejection but didn’t know what it would look like, and they 
knew to expect nerve recovery, but they didn’t know how good 
it would be; they didn’t know how high morbidity would be, or 
how few patients would have the indication for transplant. Some 
knowledge is always unknowable. But in the early 2000s, face 
transplant surgeons found themselves in the intractable situation 
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of being asked to know everything, with absolute certainty, 
before proceeding. The problem being, as Delaporte has argued, 
that this certainty cannot be generated, and no new knowledge 
created, except by doing the uncertain thing. Following this 
equation, the extent to which a system allows for uncertainty 
and risk is a predictor of how innovative it will be. The face 
transplant case study offers a way to investigate the innovative 
capacity of overlapping systems of influence in the UK in the 
early 2000s, namely the NHS, professional associations like the 
RCS, the media and the public.
Concepts of what is knowable and what is unknowable are 
relevant to this case study more broadly, in theoretical and meth-
odological ways. Oral history begs questions about the extent 
to which memory and forgetting, story- telling and narrative 
conventions, shape what we are able to know about the past 
through the testimonies of our witnesses. At the same time, 
approaching this research from a constructivist humanities 
perspective means that our ways of knowing, and the knowl-
edge that we produce, is outside of the paradigm of surgery as a 
subject of study. In a world where competition for funding and 
prestige is fierce, nobody is used to talking about how the game 
is played, only about the papers that are published.
As a subject of interdisciplinary, contemporary history, the face 
transplant that didn’t happen in the UK forces us to confront ques-
tions about how we ‘do’ history, as well as the narrow confines of 
the subject. All forms of innovative and experimental medicine 
are necessarily contested and controversial, at least at the time of 
their discovery. Nothing that has taken place in the field of facial 
transplantation since the findings of the RCS working party has 
given the lie to the uncertainty and scepticism raised. Many of 
the issues around immunosuppressants, donation and rejection 
continue to be debated, and ethical uncertainties remain. More-
over, there is a general lack of comparative international data on 
outcomes, and continued uncertainty about who constitutes an 
ideal patient, and whether consent can ever truly be secured. The 
UK experience, ultimately, provides a microcosm of the issues 
involved in any kind of experimental surgery, drawing attention 
to the political, social, economic, emotional and practical issues 
involved in surgical innovation, and the patient/practitioner rela-
tionship. The themes raised about the choice of patient, and the 
balancing of risk versus opportunity, moreover, continues to be 
central to medical ethics, and medical practice. It is not only at 
the edge of innovation that the conundrum of the ‘ideal’ versus 
the ‘real’ patient exists (Vincent and Amalberti 2016, 13- 25).
Patient and public involvement
It was not appropriate or possible to involve patients or the 
public in the design, or conduct, or reporting, or dissemination 
plans of our research.
Twitter Fay Bound Alberti @fboundalberti
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NOTES
1. A face transplant is a type of VCA, in which multiple tissues (including skin, fat, 
muscle, nerves, bone, teeth and hair) are transferred from a dead donor to a recipient. 
Other examples include hand and upper limb, womb, penis and abdominal wall. With 
the exception of womb and abdominal wall VCAs are used primarily in plastic and 
reconstructive surgery; all are life- enhancing rather than life- saving. Like all transplants, 
face transplants come with significant medical risks. Recipients require a strict regime 
of immunosuppressant drugs to stop their bodies rejecting the graft. This medication 
has multiple side effects, including increased risks of infections, cancer and renal 
failure.
2. Integrated Research Application System (IRAS) reference number 275650: AboutFace, 
approval granted March 2020.
3. Informed consent is a complex but critical subject that will be discussed in- depth by 
the authors in a follow- up article.
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